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U.S. and U.S.S.R. Would Both Gain By Korean Truce

WASHINGTON—Only an extraordinary change in the suspicious attitudes of the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward each other could translate into a general settlement of East-West issues—the common interest of the two great powers in obtaining and keeping a truce in Korea. Yet if this common interest does not promise to inaugurate an era of peace, it could save us from an orgy of war. For it improves the chance that the Truman Administration will realize the aim of the foreign policy it has based on military alliances—the prevention of a large-scale conflict.

The danger to that policy implicit in continuation of the Korean struggle, or in resumption of hostilities following an inconclusive truce, lies in the possibility that this hitherto limited war might spread beyond Korea into China. The prospect for some basic agreement in Korea, at least in military terms, is bright, no matter how irritatingly long the effort to reach agreement may last, because both Washington and Moscow have genuine reasons to end the fighting.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Interests

For the United States, this little war threatens always to become a big war in an uncongenial region. The little war is not popular, or even widely understood, at home. It has achieved its purpose by demonstrating to warring powers, in the Soviet sphere that the United Nations will use military force to oppose aggression. And its military goal has been won through the recovery of the southern Korean territories temporarily occupied by the North Koreans and their allies.

For the Soviet Union, the war has lost all possibility of prompt success. Not only

have the North Koreans failed to win control over South Korea, but the UN forces have established the line of battle well within North Korea. The advance of the UN northward weakens Russia's security. Having lost the opportunity to see sympathizers in control of all Korea, Moscow has a reasonable interest in having at least North Korea governed by its friends. Every aspect of Soviet interest is not visible here; one reason is that not all aspects of Soviet interest in Korea were plain before the war broke out in June 1950. The Chinese Communists have established an influence in North Korea which they did not have before their troops entered the war. Some students of rivalries within the Soviet sphere believe this development contributed to Moscow's interest in a Korean peace, which conceivably could check the spread of Chinese influence. Thus both the United States and the U.S.S.R. stand to gain by peace in Korea.

The United States began to make its interest in Korean peace officially known when Secretary of State Dean Acheson took his turn as a witness in the MacArthur hearings before the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committees. The prospect of peace assumed more concrete meaning when Jacob A. Malik, U.S.S.R. delegate to the United Nations, in a radio speech on June 23, suggested a cease-fire. Two days later the *People's Daily*, official Peiping newspaper, supported in a general way the Malik suggestion on behalf of the Chinese Communist government.

The United States at first greeted the Malik address with wary suspicion. Was it an effort to gain a military advantage for North Korea and China? The Soviet

attitude was not wholly clear; was Deputy Foreign Minister Malik looking for a truce that would require all foreign armies to withdraw from Korea? Such an arrangement would reduce Chinese Communist influence in North Korea; it would also leave South Korea exposed just as it had been after the departure of American troops in 1949. On June 29 the Truman Administration decided to test the full meaning of the Malik broadcast. As a result of a decision by the National Security Council at the White House, General Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of the United Nations forces, broadcast on June 30 to "the commander in chief, Communist forces in Korea," an invitation to an armistice parley to be held at a neutral site, the Danish hospital ship *Hulandtia*, at anchor in Wonsan harbor, which is in territory under Communist control. The crux of the Ridgway message was his proposal that the two sides agree on "adequate guarantees" for the maintenance of an armistice.

General Ridgway has been working out the negotiation of the cease-fire and armistice under the direction of the United States government, acting on behalf of the United Nations. This arrangement simplifies the difficult task of bringing the war to a halt, because it eliminates the necessity of satisfying the diverse interests of all other powers associated with us in Korea. The government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), for example, is disappointed by the limited military aim of the UN and would prefer General Ridgway either to fight his way across the whole of North Korea or insist in the armistice on some scheme for unity. The United States is ignoring this view.

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It has been more difficult for the Communist allies to find a unified position toward a truce. Since the Soviet Union is not a participant in the war, it could not send its military emissary to talk with General Ridgway's emissary; to do so would create a sensation. Yet the United States, which has voiced objections in the past to the influence Moscow exerts over most other Communist countries, counts on the Kremlin to guide the emissary of some other country in the armistice and pre-armistice talks. Is this "other country" to be the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) or Communist China? On the whole, Communist China has remained quiet about the prospect of peace, and some of the rare Chinese comment stresses the desirability of bringing to an end the "Korean issue" (meaning an end of territorial disunity and the elimination of the South Korean government unfriendly to China) rather than an end of the Korean war, which is a different matter. Such hints at Chinese independence, however, need not prove

insurmountable barriers to Soviet-Korean-Chinese agreement about an armistice.

Future Policy on China

In seeking to achieve peace in Korea, the Truman Administration has counted on continued support by the American public for other features of United States foreign policy. Yet if the end of the Korean war should dissipate American interest in the North Atlantic treaty, General Eisenhower's efforts to create a European army embodying American units, and our apparently impending sponsorship of West German rearmament, then a Korean truce would destroy the Administration's hope of preventing war by military power and alliances. Public attitude is currently being tested in Congress where the \$8,500,000,000 foreign aid bill is under consideration. "One of the things I am worried about is that we may relax after this Korean action," Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 30, when he testified for the bill.

On the whole, however, United States foreign policy is more palatable to Congress today than it has been in the past, largely because of the hardening of the State Department's attitude toward China. The Administration apparently is ready to give Congress assurances that for the sake of peace in Korea we would not alter the basic form of our current Far Eastern policy—nonrecognition of the Chinese Communists, Formosa for the Chinese Nationalists, the militarization treaty for Japan. So far as recognition of Peiping and decisions on Formosa affect a Korean settlement, the United States will turn those matters over to the UN General Assembly for discussion and decision after a truce has been achieved. The main interest of the United States is in settling the military aspects of the war, in arranging an armistice and in letting basic problems lie over until another day if the United Nations finds it impossible to settle them now.

BLAIR BOLLES

Can Western Europe Find A 'Vital Center'?

The prospect of a cease-fire in Korea makes it more urgent than ever for us to understand the state of mind of Europe. Will the Europeans see in the Malik proposal the promise of a broader settlement for Europe and Asia—the possibility that a new balance of power may be in the making? Will this possibility cause them to slow down rearmament, partly because of their reluctance to reduce already precarious living standards, partly because of fear that Russia might regard further rearming of Western Europe as a provocation to war? If so, will Moscow have won the objective it lost at the Paris conference—a "cease-arms" in Europe?

Democracy Still Alive

While European opinion, in this period of rapid change, remains highly fluid, France's national elections of June 17, Italy's three-stage municipal elections in May and June, and elections held this year in seven of the states of West Germany give an opportunity to measure the temperature of Europe west of Russia. These various polls reveal three basic trends.

The first of these trends is encouraging for the future of democracy in Europe if it can be intelligently and effectively sustained. For in spite of grave economic strains and sharp political tensions the European nations with a democratic tradition have succeeded in ascertaining the

popular will through the orderly process of elections. France and Italy, where the Communists remain strong and authoritarian movements of the Right are reviving, have performed a miracle of self-restraint. Their governments have permitted full freedom for the expression of conflicting opinions, no matter how extreme, and have refrained from outlawing the Communists and jailing their leaders.

Authoritarianism Not Waning

Because of this respect for the traditional procedures of democracy, elections in France and Italy may be regarded as a particularly accurate reflection of popular opinion at this critical juncture. The second main trend revealed by the elections is the continuing strength of the Communists, in spite of economic recovery and, in Italy, of the powerful opposition put up by the Vatican. In France the Communists lost seats in the National Assembly (where they will have 101 as compared with their previous 183), due to an electoral law designed to achieve this very purpose. Their popular vote, however, was close to 26 per cent, and shows only a 2.2 per cent decline from the 1946 percentage. In the Italian municipal elections the Communists, also as a result of new electoral devices, lost control of governments in 940 municipalities (including such centers as Turin, Milan,

Genoa, Venice and Florence), and have thus been deprived of opportunities for patronage and direct influence. The popular vote won by the Communists in Italy, however, actually rose by 6 per cent—from 31 in the national elections of 1948 to 37 in 1951.

Important, too, for an accurate assessment of European opinion is the marked increase in votes cast for authoritarian parties of the Right. Although General Charles de Gaulle failed to achieve the spectacular success he had anticipated for his Reunion of French People, that party—which presented no candidates in 1946—won 4,039,889 votes (as compared with 5,001,618 cast for the Communists), or 21 per cent of the popular vote, obtaining 117 seats in the National Assembly. Since de Gaulle regards the Communists as foreign-controlled "separatists" who have no right to participate in the political life of France, he claims that his party—which next to the Communists won the largest popular vote—is entitled to form a cabinet. If the total vote cast for the Gaullists and Communists is taken as an indication of popular opposition to or dissatisfaction with the moderate "Third Force," then the elections reveal that 47 per cent of the voters want a change and are not averse to authoritarian rule.

In Italy the Italian Social Movement (MSI), a neo-Fascist party, did not make

so impressive a showing as the Gaullists in France, but its percentage of votes rose from 1.3 in 1948 to 5.1 in 1951. This figure may seem small, but some Italian commentators have pointed out that, although in the 1919 municipal elections fascism gained fewer votes than it did this year, three years later Mussolini was in power. Moreover, behind the MSI, and closely associated with it, are the Fasci of Revolutionary Action (FAR), an underground movement with many ties in Franco Spain, which has recently resorted to acts of terrorism. The re-emergence of Fascism in Italy is comparable to the reappearance of neo-Nazi groups in West Germany, notably the Socialist Reichs party which in May won 11 per cent of the votes in Lower Saxony.

What Kind of Center?

The persistence of communism and the renaissance of Fascist and Nazi ideas have caused a heart-searching reassessment of the prospects for a stable center group which could safeguard democracy and hold authoritarianism of both Right and Left at bay. American, as well as European observers, are coming to the sober conclusion that anti-communism will not, of itself, prevent totalitarianism. On the contrary, as shown in France, Italy and West Germany, it may play into the hands of Fascist and Nazi groups, which are just as opposed to Western-type democracy as the Communists and, because of their extremist nationalism, are hostile to cooperation with the United States. Nor is economic recovery sufficient to stem pro-totalitarian sentiment as had been anticipated at the inauguration of the Marshall Plan in 1947. France, Italy and West Germany, have achieved striking results in recuperating from the material destruction and moral deterioration of the war years; and United States aid has proved of great value in speeding this recupera-

tive process. Because of obsolete economic and social institutions, however, the benefits of recovery have all too often failed to filter down to the rank and file of workers and peasants who continue to press for improvement of their lot. Under the circumstances, workers and, in Italy, peasants also, tend to support the Communists—not because of ideology, or of devotion to Moscow, as is frequently assumed in the United States—but because of lack of faith in the purposefulness and efficacy of the moderate center parties.

This lack of faith was reflected in the 1951 elections. In France the percentage of the popular vote won by the Third Force parties (Socialists, Popular Republicans and Radicals) dropped from 55 in 1946 to 37.3 in 1951. In Italy the coalition led by Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi's Christian Democrats gained only 37.3 per cent of the popular vote in 1951 as compared with 55 per cent in 1948. In West Germany the Christian Democrats led by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer have been losing ground to the Social Democrats.

The results of the elections indicate a third trend—an attempt to find a new “vital center” through reinvigoration of the Socialist parties, which since the war have been losing adherents among workers and intellectuals—most of all to the Communists, but to some extent also to Fascist groups. In Italy the Socialist party at present seems hopelessly divided and impotent to play a constructive role. In France, the Socialist party has reasserted itself to some extent—C. L. Sulzberger reported on June 18 in the *New York Times* “a reassuring trend toward socialism rather than communism among the Marxist voters.” The French Socialists, however, will face a difficult dilemma in mid-July when it comes to the formation of a new cabinet—for the Third Force will need the support of the new Fourth Force (Independent, Peasant and Conservative groups) which

won 12.9 per cent of the popular vote and 99 seats in the National Assembly; and the Fourth Force, as the price of its support, may demand abandonment of reforms which form the core of the Socialist program. It is in West Germany that the Socialists, led by Dr. Kurt Schumacher, have gained the most impressive successes.

In an effort to consolidate Socialist forces, representatives of twenty-two Socialist parties formed a new Socialist International on June 30 at their eighth international conference held in Frankfurt under the chairmanship of Dr. Schumacher. The “Declaration of the Principles of Democratic Socialism” adopted at Frankfurt—not without considerable debate—clarified Socialist thinking, realigning it with the practical experience of Socialist governments in the post-war period. While both communism and capitalism were denounced, the declaration was far more critical of the former than of the latter, and asserted that individual freedom and political liberties are the supreme moral objectives of socialism. The document referred to the “class struggle” but noted that class lines have changed considerably since the nineteenth century, when “socialism first developed as a movement of wage earners.” Socialist planning, according to the declaration, does not presuppose public ownership of all means of production and is compatible with private ownership in agriculture, handicrafts, retail trade and in small and medium-sized industries.

The next question is whether the Socialists, as urged by British Laborite Morgan Phillips, will support rearmament (now vigorously opposed by the German Social Democrats) as a safeguard against Russia, or will take the position that communism must be combated first of all by economic and social improvements which rearmament might indefinitely postpone.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

India's Congress Party Challenged By New Split

The formation at Patna on June 16 of a new political organization—the People's party—by a group of Indian leaders who have resigned from the dominant Congress party indicates the rise of political ferment in India. During India's long years of struggle against British rule the Congress party was an all-embracing nationalist movement in which the most varied elements cooperated. But since the achievement of independence in 1947 some groups and individuals critical of the actions of the new government have tended

to break away. One important defection occurred early in 1948, when the Socialist party of India was formed by men who had been prominent in the Congress, notably Jaiprakash Narayan. The recent establishment of still another political organization follows the resignation, within the past month, of a group of Congress party members estimated at several thousand.

Ideology Not the Issue

The principal leader of the current secessionists is Acharya J. B. Kripalani, a vet-

eran nationalist who was elected President of the Congress in October 1946. Kripalani's break with the party has come gradually. In November 1947, a few months after independence, he resigned his presidential post in dissatisfaction over the initial course of the new government. However, he remained a member of the supreme Congress body, the Working Committee, while voicing sharp criticisms of policy on a number of occasions. In December 1949, for example, he delivered a biting parliamentary attack on the government's failure

to avert a sugar shortage and to curb sugar blackmarketing.

In August 1950 Kripalani lost a contest for the Congress presidency in which he had the support of Prime Minister Nehru. Purshottamdas Tandon, the victorious candidate, was backed by the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, then the key figure in the Congress party machine. This election was a major defeat for Kripalani in his efforts to win control of the Congress from within. Still another setback occurred in May 1951, when Tandon's dominant right-wing group in the All-India Congress Committee refused to allot more than two seats to Kripalani's wing of the Congress party in choosing a Central Election Committee. This development precipitated the break between Kripalani and the Congress.

A devoted adherent of Gandhian philosophy, Kripalani declares that he has no ideological quarrel with the Congress and disagrees only on the implementation of policy. His position is that the party has a good program, which is not being carried out. In support of this stand, he alleges that the nationalist movement has deteriorated morally since independence; that self-seeking corrupt elements have come to control it; that Indian business has too much influence in the government; and that the continuing power of the bureaucracy inherited from British days constitutes an obstacle to reform. His criticism of the government, however, has so far been much more precise than his exposition of the policies he would follow if his group were in power.

While Kripalani's struggle for control of the Congress machine has revolved about major issues, on the local level the People's party's break with the Congress sometimes goes back to purely personal or factional differences. The new organization's general significance, however, is suggested by the fact that it consists in the main of former followers of Nehru. Kripalani's movement has the sympathy of Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Nehru's Communications Minister, who attended the party's founding convention as an observer. Kidwai has not yet resigned from the Congress, but has indicated that he may do so.

The People's party platform urges that India concentrate on its domestic problem of poverty and restrain an "impulse to save the world." While making this im-

plied criticism of Nehru's Korea mediation efforts, the manifesto favors a general foreign policy of non-alignment in the "cold war," such as India has broadly followed. The program also warns against a "wholesale nationalization of industry." This, too, is a criticism of Nehru, although it should be noted that the Prime Minister in 1949 indicated the abandonment of any such intentions for a decade or longer. On the whole, while the new party stands to the right of Nehru on some questions, the platform bears out Kripalani's contention that the split is not ideological.

General Elections a Test

The government has tentatively scheduled for next November or December the first general elections to be held since independence. (These are also to be India's first elections based on universal suffrage.) The potentialities of Kripalani's party are as yet unclear, but at present the Congress remains the only powerful, countrywide party. The Socialists and Communists on the left, and the Hindu Mahasabha (with the associated Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, or R.S.S.S.) on the right, have strength in specific areas, but do not currently represent a challenge to the government on a national scale. The Communists, for example, are influential in parts of Hyderabad, Madras, Assam, and some other places, but not in India as a whole. While possessing potentialities of growth, the Communists have been divided for well over a year by questions of leadership and policy, and the government under Nehru has taken strong action to check their activities.

One possibility which could affect the political picture would be an electoral combination between the Kripalani group and the Socialists. The latter, who have gained strength in the past few years, play an important part in the labor movement, have organized peasant unions, and are carrying on extensive propaganda against the government in middle class circles. A year ago the Socialist membership was approximately 150,000, and is presumably higher today.

The economic situation, not surprisingly, is probably the major factor in current Indian politics. As a result of President Tru-

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON THE FAR EAST

India Afire, by Clare and Harris Wofford, Jr. New York, John Day, 1951. \$4.

Two young Americans, on the basis of a six-month study of current developments in India, paint a broad, in many aspects sad but not altogether pessimistic, picture of a vast country undergoing the travail of adaptation to independence. While some of their comments sound naive, they succeed in conveying vivid impressions, notably of Prime Minister Nehru and the Socialist leader Jaiprakash Narayan.

A Short History of the Far East, by Kenneth Scott Latourette. Rev. ed. New York, Macmillan, 1951. \$5.25.

Brought up to date, this valuable volume provides a comprehensive summary of essential background information for an understanding of "the peoples, the cultures and the current problems" of an increasingly important part of the world.

China and the Soviet Union: A Study of Sino-Soviet Relations, by Aitcher K. Wu. New York, Day, 1950. \$6.

India and China: A Thousand Years of Cultural Relations, by Prabodh Chandra Bagchi. 2nd ed. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. \$4.50.

As the problem of fitting a resurgent, Communist-controlled China into the "society of nations" becomes increasingly difficult, public attention has been directed to China's foreign relations, a field in which these two volumes make significant contributions. Dr. Wu, formerly Chinese consul-general in Vladivostok and professor of international relations, has produced a comprehensive and, on the whole, balanced account of diplomatic intercourse between Russia and China from the seventeenth century to the present time. The latter work, by an Indian scholar, stresses particularly the flow of cultural and religious ideas from India to China between 200 B.C. and 1000 A.D.

The China Story, by Freda Utley. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1951. \$3.50.

A bitter attack upon postwar American foreign policy in China—to which is attributed in large part the collapse of the Nationalist government on the mainland—denouncing individuals and groups said to have framed this policy.

man's signature, on June 15, of an act to lend India the money to purchase here two million tons of grain, and of commercial arrangements made by India with a number of countries, including China, a food catastrophe will be averted. This will presumably strengthen the government's position. But the overall economic situation, already serious before the famine crisis, will remain difficult, creating occasions for discontent and opposition activity.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(Mr. Rosinger is the editor and one of the authors of the recently published work, *The State of Asia: A Contemporary Survey* (New York, Knopf). His previous books include *India and the United States* and *Restless India*).

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